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Abstract 
 
Purpose 
The supply chain literature discusses various models of supply chain collaboration and 
integration. When applied to logistics, each has been shown to exhibit different levels of 
success depending on particular factors. This paper examines a strategic alliance between a 
large shipper and a freight forwarder to provide an intermodal service to and from the port of 
Gothenburg. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The methodology is a single in-depth case study based on action research, interviews and 
document analysis. 
 
Findings 
According to this innovative model, a new entity is not set up but an open-book basis is 
established, long-term contracts with other parties are signed, risks and profits are shared, and 
the shipper makes several investments specific to the service. Thus the benefits of a joint 
venture are obtained without needing to establish a new organisation and thus sacrifice 
flexibility and independence. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
A limitation of this study is that it is based on a single case of best practice; it may be difficult 
to replicate the high levels of trust in other situations. Nevertheless, the evident success of 
this “virtual joint venture” suggests that some elements are transferable to other cases, and 
the model may be refined through additional case analysis. 
 
Practical implications 
Results indicate several advantages of this “virtual joint venture” model, including risk 
sharing, knowledge development, long-term service stability and diversification of activities 
which all contribute to facilitating the shift of a large customer from road haulage to 
intermodal transport. Potential challenges mainly relate to contractual complexity. 
 
Originality/value 
This paper identifies an innovative business model for logistics integration that can be used in 
future in other cases to make modal shift more attractive and successful, which is a key aim 
of government policy in many countries. 
 
Key words: business model, governance, intermodal transport, logistics, cooperative, 
collaboration, supply chain management, integration, strategic alliance.  
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1. Introduction 
 The supply chain and logistics literature contains many studies of horizontal and vertical 
integration and collaboration, whether that be in the supply chain or in the provision of 
logistics services. Supply chain integration is covered more frequently, including integrating 
the ownership or processes of suppliers, producers, and so on, up and down the vertical 
supply chain, or horizontal integration or collaboration among partners at the same level (e.g. 
suppliers joining a cooperative).  
A subset of supply chain integration is logistics integration. The customer for the logistics 
process may have any kind of supply chain strategy, but in this paper the focus is on the 
provision of logistics services, mostly transport. Building on previous work in the transport 
literature, where consolidation of flows and the “co-location” of logistics services at transport 
hubs have been considered ways to support intermodal transport services (Rodrigue et al., 
2010; Monios, 2014), this paper examines the potential of a specific type of strategic alliance, 
a “virtual joint venture”, as a governance form for transport services. The focus of this paper 
is on the business model adopted rather than on the operational aspects of modal shift (for 
which see Woodburn, 2003; Eng-Larsson and Kohn, 2012; Monios, 2015). 
The purpose is to see how this model can address many of the issues of logistics 
collaboration, such as efficiency gains, knowledge sharing, trust and joint marketing. Against 
a background where intermodal transport has struggled to compete with road due to 
inefficiencies stemming partly from transaction costs of a fragmented system, the aim is to 
explore the potential of a new model that develops new shared services (in this case, rail 
services) for the benefit of all partners. Little research has been done on direct involvement of 
customers in managing their own intermodal transport, partly because shippers rarely possess 
the specialised knowledge and experience to do so. Jensen and Sorkina (2013) explored cases 
of large shippers managing their own intermodal transport services in-house rather than 
contracting such services from the market. This paper looks beyond outsourcing a single role 
or collaborating on an occasional product or service towards a more integrated and extended 
collaborative planning and consolidation of demand to ensure efficient and fully-loaded 
intermodal services. 
 The paper begins with a literature review on supply chain integration and collaboration in 
order to identify the main drivers and challenges, before proceeding to a discussion of the 
different types of business models used to manage a variety of strategic alliances in the 
supply chain. The third part of the literature review narrows the focus from supply chain 
integration to logistics integration, identifying the kinds of business models generally applied 
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in the logistics sector to manage transport and related services. A two-stage conceptual 
framework is then developed that will be used to identify and explore the characteristics of 
the virtual joint venture model, first as a more generic case of logistics management, and then 
proceeding to identify and classify the model as a new form of strategic alliance. The case 
study and action research methodology is established in section 3, while section 4 presents 
the empirical research based on a single in-depth case study of a virtual joint venture business 
model providing intermodal transport services in Sweden. The case study is then analysed to 
determine the advantages and disadvantages of such a model, before the key features of the 
model are defined and conclusions drawn on how this model can be used in future to obtain 
buy-in of large shippers towards modal shift of their traffic from road haulage to intermodal 
transport. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Supply chain management, collaboration and integration 
Supply chain management is a process of coordination between partners in a supply 
chain, aiming to improve performance for individual companies as well as the supply chain 
as a whole (Mentzer et al., 2001). In order to manage the supply chain effectively, greater 
collaboration between partners is required, as it is increasingly accepted that competition is 
now between supply chains rather than between individual competitors. Supply chain actors 
must make decisions regarding with whom to collaborate, in what way and to what extent. 
Supply chain collaboration involves working across organisational boundaries, sharing 
resources and working cooperatively (Fawcett et al., 2008a). 
Supply chain collaboration involves both internal and external dimensions. Internal 
collaboration refers to coordination of processes or departments, as often the logistics 
department is not coordinated with the purchasing or marketing department (Gimenez & 
Ventura, 2005; Lambert et al., 2008). External collaboration is the process of collaborating 
with external partners in the supply chain (Stank et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2009).  
Several papers have examined the motivations for supply chain collaboration, as well as 
the potential barriers and facilitators (e.g. Whipple & Frankel, 2000; Min et al., 2005; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Fawcett et al., 2008a, 2008b; Richey 
et al., 2010; Guan & Rehme, 2012). Simatupang & Sridharan (2005) defined the three key 
dimensions of collaboration as information sharing, decision synchronisation and incentive 
alignment, while Whipple & Frankel (2000) defined the success factors as trust, senior 
management support, ability to meet performance expectations, clear goals and partner 
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compatibility. Fawcett et al. (2006) found that management commitment to supply chain 
collaboration is lacking, while Daugherty (2011) identified some scepticism in the literature 
about the ability to achieve true collaboration between partners, as, more than simply 
outsourcing a specific function, collaboration requires that resources or processes must be 
integrated (Bowersox et al., 2003).  
Fawcett et al. (2008a) derived 25 practices and requirements for supply chain 
collaboration, summarised into seven categories: management commitment, supply chain 
mapping and role definition, information sharing and system integration, people management 
and development, performance measurement, relationship management and trust building, 
rationalisation and simplification. Similarly, Fawcett et al. (2008b) derived a 30-point 
framework, based on the top ten benefits (split into customer focus and company focus), 
barriers (split into interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity) and bridges (split into 
operations management and people management) to strategic supply chain management. Part 
of the analysis of the case study will be based on this framework. 
Knowledge sharing is an important aspect of collaboration, and will be particularly 
relevant in relation to improving efficiencies in transport operations as discussed in this 
paper. However, it takes the investment of time and resources, and risks of losing that 
investment if withdrawing from the relationship or suffering opportunist behaviour of supply 
chain partners (Bergqvist, 2007; Gligor & Holcomb, 2013). Furthermore, organisations need 
to consider whether the gains from knowledge sharing outweigh the loss or dilution of the 
competitive advantage derived from that knowledge (Mohr & Sengupta, 2002; Cheng et al., 
2008). In addition, knowledge can be both explicit, thus easily shared, and implicit, which is 
difficult to convey or capture and requires closer and longer social relationships to exploit 
(Lang, 2004). Various factors influence knowledge sharing in a supply chain (Spekman et al., 
2002; Cheng et al., 2008) and the creation of new knowledge is also often an explicit aim of 
supply chain cooperation (Wu, 2008). 
 
2.2 Governance forms for supply chain collaboration and integration 
A continuum stretches from a purely transaction- or market-based approach at one end to 
a fully integrated ownership model at the other (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Golicic & Mentzer, 
2006; Rinehart et al., 2004). The former are governed by contracts of varying duration, 
regularly compared with the price and service offered by competitors, whereas integration 
models can include a merger, an outright purchase of one firm by another or the creation of a 
new organisation through a joint venture. In between these two extremes lies a variety of 
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dynamic hybrid or relational models, which can be summarised into partnerships and 
alliances (Rinehart et al., 2004; Halldorsson & Skjott-Larsen, 2006; Lambert et al., 1996, 
1999; Humphries et al., 2007; Daugherty, 2011). While a partnership involves a larger or 
longer commitment than a regular contractual relationship, an alliance takes this arrangement 
further in a close relationship designed to maximise synergies and achieve a desired strategic 
outcome (Lambert et al., 1999). The partners in an alliance will likely need to modify their 
existing logistical setup to increase efficiency under the new alliance model (Frankel et al., 
1996); however, formal control mechanisms like contracts and the resulting transaction costs 
of monitoring, etc. are replaced to a certain degree by trust (Todeva & Knoke, 2005). The 
actual form taken by the alliance will depend on several factors, such as the motive, the 
business environment, industry structure, organisational structure and other drivers (Todeva 
& Knoke, 2005). 
Market or contractual governance means that relationships are managed through contracts 
with incentives or penalties. As firms move towards greater collaboration, relational 
characteristics such as trust, information sharing and mutual decision making become more 
important. Different mechanisms can be used to coordinate partner relationships, such as 
monitoring, incentives/hostages and social enforcement based on personal relationships 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000). Dyer & Singh (1998) distinguished between third-party 
enforcement mechanisms (contracts) and self-enforcing mechanisms (specific investments, 
financial incentives and trust). Cai et al. (2009) noted the importance of joint problem solving 
and planning and collaborative communication, while Hernández-Espallardo & Arcas-Lario 
(2003) suggested formalisation, participation, input control, behaviour control and output 
control. 
Todeva & Knoke (2005) developed a 13-stage model of cooperation structure capturing 
the spectrum from market/contract to hierarchy/integration: market relations, action sets, 
industry standard groups, subcontractor networks, licensing, franchising, cartels, strategic 
cooperative agreements, R&D consortia, cooperatives, equity investments, joint ventures, 
hierarchical relations. Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) condensed these hybrid types (and 
other previous work by Parkhe, 1991; Dussauge & Garrette, 1997; Klint & Sjöberg, 2003) 
into four: verbal agreements, written contracts without equity involvement, minority stake 
agreements, joint venture agreements. Thus the key element in that formulation is the level of 
the financial stake taken by the partners. Lambert et al. (1999) identified three types of 
cooperation in the hybrid range: in the first type, activities and planning are coordinated to a 
limited degree; in the second, this is developed to integration of some business planning and 
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the timescale is lengthened; the third has an indefinite timescale and is considered a “strategic 
alliance”, often with an explicit contractual basis. In that division, it is the level of strategic 
collaboration that defines the three stages. Similarly, Spekman et al. (1998) consider an 
evolution from cooperation to coordination to collaboration. Whipple & Russell (2007) 
developed a typology of three types of collaborative approaches on a continuum from less to 
more integrated: transaction management, event management and process management. 
Questions have been raised as to whether the supply chain collaboration idealised in the 
literature is actually happening in reality (Spekman et al., 1998; Min et al., 2005; Fawcett et 
al., 2006; Sandberg, 2007; Fawcett et al., 2008a). In particular, Sandberg (2007) found that 
supply chain collaboration was mostly in operations, and was missing a deliberate strategic 
aspect. 
 
2.3 Governance forms and logistics business models 
 The previous section identified different business models that have been applied to supply 
chain integration, such as contracts, partnerships, alliances, joint ventures and ownership. 
These models can apply to the supply chain (for example an exclusive contract between a 
supplier and a distributor to provide computer components) or can be specifically related to 
logistics services (for example a joint venture between a 3PL and a rail operator to develop a 
new rail service). 
 Mentzer et al. (2004; p.607) described logistics management as “a within-firm function 
that has cross-function and cross-firm (i.e. boundary-spanning) aspects to it.” They go on to 
say that “logistics is one (if not the major) of the contributions to the benefits of supply chain 
management” (p.618). As with supply chain collaboration discussed in the preceding 
sections, logistics arrangements can vary from purely market-based contractual short-term 
relationships to information sharing through informal trust-based relationships to full 
integration through ownership. It is common for the transport function to be fully integrated 
within a 3PL through ownership, while the relationship of interest in this research is that 
between the shipper and the logistics service provider or freight forwarder. How much 
information is shared, how is risk allocated, to what extent are decisions truly collaborative? 
As with supply chain collaboration, a difference has been observed between strategic and 
operational collaboration (Fugate et al., 2009). 
Other logistics decisions influence potential integration, such as the centralisation and 
relocation of plants and distribution centres, a reduction in the supplier base and a 
consolidation of the carrier base (Lemoine & Skjoett-Larsen, 2004; Abrahamsson & Brege, 
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1997). Supply chains are being reconfigured around rationalisation of transport requirements, 
changing distribution strategies and new hub locations. (Lemoine & Skjoett-Larsen, 2004). 
Bowersox et al. (1989) established a 5-stage model of logistics integration: single 
transactions, repeated transactions, partnerships, third-party agreements, integrated logistics 
service agreements. Similar to the integration models described in section 2.2, in this model 
the partnership stage is when the shipper retains control of planning and management, while a 
third-party agreement is when the 3PL takes a more direct role in the relationship with a 
tailored service requiring information sharing, which increases the level of trust required. 
Finally, an integrated service agreement is where the entire logistics function or at least large 
parts of it have been outsourced to the 3PL. This will necessarily require a higher level of 
information integration, possibly through joint ICT, and may also include additional value-
added services as the inventory may in fact be stored at warehouses operated by the 3PL. 
Simatupang & Sridharan (2002) highlighted three aspects of coping with the complex 
decision making of logistics that can benefit from information sharing among supply chain 
partners: synchronising the logistics decision horizon for forward-looking planning, 
consolidating multi-party logistics processes such as matching shippers and carriers or 
resource availability, and integrating functional scope such as product development, logistics 
and marketing. 
 In supply chain management, vertical collaboration involves relationships with supply 
chain partners up and down the chain. In vertical logistics collaboration, the integration is not 
along the supply chain but relates to the provision of logistical services, including transport. 
For instance, a shipper forming a relationship with a 3PL and a rail operator would be an 
example of vertical collaboration as far as logistics is concerned (Lehtinen & Bask, 2012). 
Examples of vertical collaboration in transport and logistics include vendor managed 
inventory (VMI), efficient customer response (ECR) and collaborative planning, forecasting 
and replenishment (CPFR) (McCarthy & Golicic, 2002; Disney & Towil, 2003; Esper & 
Williams, 2003; Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003; Tuominen, 2004; Cruijssen et al., 2007b). 
As with horizontal supply chain collaboration, horizontal collaborations in logistics are 
likewise with competitors (whether 3PLs or transport providers running services together, or 
shippers combining loads together to provide economies of scale). A further complication is 
when a 3PL combines loads for separate customers, which is not actual horizontal 
collaboration on behalf of the shippers but achieves a similar effect. It could even be 
described as a horizontal cooperation with a vertical character, for example when a number of 
shippers adopt similar pallet or container types or use a shared transport hub in order for a 
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3PL or transport provider to provide a joint service with lower cost to all users. Mason et al. 
(2007; p.188) discussed the need to combine “vertical collaboration to reduce costs and 
improve service levels as well as horizontally with industry partners to better utilise assets 
and hence to further reduce costs.” Hingley et al. (2011) studied the potential of a 4PL to 
manage horizontal collaboration among large retailers and found reluctance, as control of the 
supply chain was more important to retailers than improving asset utilisation. 
Cruijssen et al. (2007b) noted that horizontal collaboration is common in the maritime 
and aviation sectors, but less so in landside transport and logistics, due to different 
characteristics, such as the large number of players and increasing competitiveness and its 
less capital-intensive nature. Research in the maritime sector has examined how ports can use 
a variety of mechanisms to coordinate the hinterland transport chain and thus reduce 
transaction costs (Panayides, 2002; de Langen & Chouly, 2004; Van der Horst & de Langen, 
2008; Van der Horst & Van der Lugt, 2009; Lagoudis, et al., 2014). Van der Horst and De 
Langen (2008) analysed different coordination strategies within competing transport chains 
that have been adopted in order to attract or secure greater container flows, identifying four 
kinds: changing the incentive structure of contracts, collective action, partnerships, and 
vertical integration. 
Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) studied horizontal collaboration among 3PLs, finding 
that, while almost 60% of 3PLs in their study operated at least one horizontal partnership 
with other 3PLs, the failure rate was below 19%, against an average failure rate for horizontal 
collaborations in many industries ranging from 50% to 70%. The authors also found that, 
while horizontal collaboration might be thought to be based on cost reduction, the primary 
motivations revealed in their study were service quality improvement and market share 
enhancement. Other research shows that conflict is more likely in horizontal partnerships 
than vertical ones because there is direct competition between partners in the same business 
(Wallenburg & Raue, 2011). Cruijssen et al. (2007a) found that cooperation on core activities 
was considered the most attractive reason for horizontal collaboration among 3PLs. 
Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) found that the most common function of logistics 
cooperations was to produce services, which suggests an operational rather than strategic 
focus, consistent with observations in the literature above. Mortensen & Lemoine (2008) 
produced similar findings in an analysis of integration between 3PLs and manufacturers. 
Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) established a six-point typology of logistics cooperation, 
depicted in Table 1. Their framework is based on horizontal cooperation, which has different 
characteristics regarding competition between members producing similar product ranges and 
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perhaps collaborating on a joint transport service to achieve economies of scale. As the 
current case is a vertical cooperation, the framework may require some modification in 
application, but it can serve as a useful structure to identify the features of the virtual joint 
venture model in logistics. 
 
Table 1. Structural characteristics of logistics cooperation (Schmoltzi & Wallenburg, 2011) 
Contractual scope Unwritten 
agreement 
Contractual 
agreement 
Minority stake 
agreement 
Joint venture 
agreement 
Organisational scope Bilateral Multilateral 
Functional scope Shared 
production 
Shared marketing 
& sales 
Shared supply Quasi-
concentration 
Geographical scope Regional Nationwide Continental Intercontinental 
Service scope Road Rail Sea Air Intermodal Value-added 
Resource scope No resource 
similarity 
Similar 
market 
competence 
Similar 
market 
penetration 
Similar 
corporate 
structure 
Extended 
resource 
similarity 
 
The key interest will be the relation between functional and service scope. How does the 
business model enable the partners to share their functional scope in order to provide joint 
services? Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) note that there remains no consensus on how to 
measure cooperation performance, and that is not the goal in this paper as it is too soon to do 
so, therefore this analysis addresses only the motivations for and structure of the business 
model. 
 
2.4 Conceptual framework for use in this paper 
A framework is required for this research that can examine logistics integration; for 
example, relationships between the partners, degree of integration, which services are 
integrated and so on. It needs to address the business model (the virtual joint venture, as 
opposed to other models such as partnerships, etc.), the partners, the activities and the 
outcomes. It also needs to highlight barriers and facilitators. The first part of the analysis will 
therefore be based on the benefits, barriers and bridges to successful supply chain 
management identified by Fawcett et al. (2008b), which summarises the key features 
identified from the literature in section 2.1. However, a second level of analysis will be 
required to identify and classify the specific features of the virtual joint venture as applied to 
logistics, and more specifically as it is applied to facilitating modal shift to intermodal 
transport. The second stage analysis summarises the key features from the literature in 
sections 2.2 (governance forms in supply chains) and 2.3 (narrowing the focus to governance 
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forms in logistics). This second stage of the analysis will use the Schmoltzi & Wallenburg 
(2011) framework to analyse the application of the new governance form to logistics as 
compared with other business models, and identify its key features so it can be applied in 
future cases.  
 
3. Methodology  
According to Yin (2009), a case study approach is appropriate when “how” or “why” 
questions are being asked, when the investigator does not have control over events (as one 
might in an experimental methodology) and when the phenomenon being studied cannot be 
separated from its context. All of these criteria are present in the current research, therefore a 
case study methodology has been adopted. The case was selected as a unique case, according 
to Yin’s (2009) five-way split of cases (critical, extreme/unique, representative/typical, 
revelatory and longitudinal). The virtual joint venture model has not been applied in the 
logistics literature before, therefore this unique case will have much to teach. The case is a 
jointly developed intermodal transport service operating between the Port of Gothenburg and 
Jula’s central warehouse and distribution centre in Skara via the inland terminal in Falköping, 
located about 120km from the port.
1
 
Data were collected through site visits where face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
representatives from Jula, Schenker Air and Ocean Sweden, the terminal operator in 
Falköping, Port of Gothenburg, APM Terminals and the municipality of Falköping. The 
research approach can be characterised as longitudinal since the authors had the opportunity 
to study this development from point of original idea to the actual implementation. When Jula 
and Schenker started to discuss an intermodal transport solution, they contacted the authors of 
this paper, and hence we were given an early opportunity to study the development close up. 
A total of 21 interviews were conducted during a period of 24 months. Three representatives 
were interviewed repeatedly: the Logistics Manager Jula AB, the Manager Schenker AB, 
Division Air & Ocean and the Development and Logistics Manager of the Municipality of 
Falköping. During the research process there were substantial interactions and exchange of 
ideas whereby the research process could also be characterised as action research. Interview 
data were supplemented by desk research to collect research reports, company reports and 
brochures and additional industry data. The advantage of personal site visits is that it allows 
                                                          
1
 For a comprehensive background to intermodal transport in Sweden, see Bergqvist and Woxenius (2011). 
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in-depth discussion around the semi-structured interview template, and provides the 
opportunity to ask additional questions prompted by viewing the operations.  
The first step in the analysis was to review the interview and documentary data several 
times. The data were then organised and reduced by collating evidence in a matrix based on 
the conceptual framework, according to a three-stage process of data reduction, display and 
conclusion drawing and verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Gaps in the matrix were 
identified and filled by follow-up emails as well as further data collection via desk research. 
An iterative process was followed, moving back and forth between data collection, analysis, 
interpretation and explanation, making use of triangulation to strengthen interpretations.  
 
4. Case study 
4.1 Company background 
 Jula operates in the DIY segment and focuses on offering professionals an attractive 
range at low prices. This is possible through large purchases directly from manufacturers all 
over the world, without intermediaries. The product range has over the years been expanded 
to include tools, equipment, work clothing, garden products, paints and household items. As 
of 2014, the company has 73 department stores in three countries (Sweden 41, Norway 21, 
Poland 11) and 2,400 employees. The 2013 company turnover was €0.5 billion with profits 
reaching €57 million. The company has a strong equity ratio of 48% (2013). Logistics wise, 
all flows are coordinated and consolidated at the 100,000m
2
 (expansion of additional 
50,000m
2 
planned to be completed by 2015) central warehouse and distribution centre in 
Skara. The majority of incoming goods to the central warehouse consist of imported 
containers, mainly from Asia. Schenker Air and Ocean in Sweden hold the Jula key account 
and coordinate incoming container flows. 
 
4.2 Initiative 
Jula and Schenker Air and Ocean have had a close collaboration for more than a decade 
before the discussions regarding a joint intermodal transport service started. The first initial 
ideas about an intermodal transport service came from the municipality of Falköping who did 
a pre-study to analyze the possibilities of a rail shuttle between the port of Gothenburg and 
the intermodal terminal at Falköping. The study proved that there was environmental and 
cost-saving potential as well as service quality improvement possibilities given that the 
container flow could be managed much more efficiently by using the terminal in Falköping as 
a buffer of full containers as well as an empty container depot, meaning that containers could 
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be more easily distributed from the terminal in Falköping to exporting companies in the 
region. At the time, empty containers were often shipped back to the port of Gothenburg and 
then re-positioned to exporting companies. Jula was experiencing an increasing cost for 
storage of full containers at the Port of Gothenburg and actually repositioned containers to a 
nearby container depot in Gothenburg. In order to achieve the identified potential, however, a 
substantial share of the container flows in the region had to be coordinated and consolidated 
on the intermodal rail service.  
The results of the study were presented to Jula management in 2011, who responded 
positively to the idea but wanted Schenker to be part of the intermodal transport solution. 
Another issue for Jula was that they have always enjoyed cheap road haulage because they 
had the largest container flows in the region and their dominant import flows were attractive 
to road hauliers when trying to match import and export container flows. The study showed 
that the intermodal transport solution could be competitive with around 10,000 TEU (twenty-
foot equivalent units) per year (cf. Ye, et al., 2014), which was a little less than Jula 
transported during 2011, even considering the company’s steady annual growth of about 10-
15%. 
It was not until 2012 that Jula’s volumes had increased to such a level that they could 
potentially make up the critical mass for a profitable and stable intermodal transport service. 
Schenker and Jula established a joint project team to realize the idea in January 2013. After 
about one year of preparations and investigations, the intermodal transport service was 
launched, with the first train departing from the container terminal of Port of Gothenburg 
(Skandiahamnen) for the inland terminal at Falköping on September 4
th
 2013. The service 
started with a “half train” of 11 wagons, with a capacity of 44 TEU in each direction. As of 
October 2014, the train capacity was increased to 17 wagons, carrying 68 TEU. The plan is to 
operate at maximum length as of 2015, i.e. with 21 wagons carrying 84 TEU in each 
direction. During this time the intermodal transport service has operated 5 times per week. 
 
4.3 Stakeholders and contracts 
 Although Jula’s volumes increased so that critical volume was achieved around 2012, 
there was a long journey ahead to coordinate all stakeholders in order to develop the 
necessary intermodal terminal facilities and to sign contracts in a synchronized manner and 
with long enough contract periods to make stakeholders willing to invest. Figure 1 illustrates 
the complexity in terms of number of agreements and the fact that they had to be coordinated 
and synchronized. Furthermore, the agreements preceded a long process of trust building in 
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order for stakeholders to establish enough confidence and willingness to invest - this refers to 
both private and public actors.  
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of agreements 
The central agreement is that between Jula and Schenker with a focus on defining how risks, 
investment and benefits are distributed. They operate an open-book agreement with a very 
high level of transparency and both actors are involved in discussions covering aspects such 
as pricing, investments, service quality and tendering processes. Both Schenker and Jula have 
recognised the importance of signing long-term contracts in order to incentivise the terminal 
operator to invest in the required handling equipment and the municipality to invest in a new 
terminal adjacent to the old terminal. Hence, Schenker, in the role as control tower, has 
signed a two-year contract with the rail operator and a five-year contract with the terminal 
operator (the terminal operator was appointed by the municipality of Falköping through the 
process of public tendering, cf. Bergqvist and Monios, 2014). 
 The Swedish rail system has been deregulated since 1988 and there is substantial 
competition in the rail haulage segment, therefore Schenker and Jula saw it as unnecessary to 
run the train themselves. In addition, they wanted to explore opportunities for creative 
suggestions the market may offer. They ran a tender whereby the rail operators were allowed 
to suggest different solutions where the Gothenburg-Falköping rail shuttle could be combined 
with other rail solutions and destinations, hence the timetable was not entirely fixed but an 
indication of favourable time windows were given. The rail operator TM Rail offered the 
most favourable option and was given a two-year contract.  
DB Schenker Jula 
Rail operator 
Terminal operator 
Road haulier 
Port terminal 
operator (APM) 
Shipping lines 
(container depot) 
ECM, wagon keeper  
Municipality of Falköping 
(revenue guarantee) 
Wagon maintenance (Swemaint 
and BS Verkstäder) 
Road haulier (terminal-central 
warehouse) 
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 In order to enable a long-term investment by the municipality of Falköping in a new 
intermodal terminal, Jula signed a separate agreement guaranteeing revenues of €250,000 for 
the intermodal terminal for a period of five years, starting 1st January 2014. Annual variable 
terminal rent fees (about €4 per handled container) are balanced against the guaranteed 
revenue in case Jula makes an exit within the five year period. This agreement has been 
crucial in order for the municipality to invest about €2.5 million in developing a new 
intermodal terminal. A critical concern in the setup has been to develop the rail shuttle in 
such a way that Jula and Schenker are flexible and independent so that the sub-contracted rail 
operator does not gain too much power; this is often the case because they generally own the 
wagons and control the timetable and the time window (slot) in the container terminal at the 
seaport. In this case, Schenker has signed an agreement with the port container terminal 
operator APM Terminals and Jula has invested in container wagons (type Lags071 and 
SGNSS). Jula becoming a wagon owner means that they had to contract an ECM (Entity in 
Charge of Maintenance) and a maintenance provider (Swemaint and the local service 
provider BS Verkstäder). The ECM provides evidence of responsibility and traceability of the 
maintenance undertaken on freight wagons in accordance with EU Regulation EU/445/2011. 
 The timetable for the train is not possible to control entirely since a rail traffic certificate is 
needed which Schenker Air & Ocean and Jula do not have. Overall, the structure of 
agreements is rather complex; however, by engaging with all interfaces, a service setup based 
on transparency and long-term commitment has been achieved which can be argued as 
necessary in order to develop cost-competitiveness on an intermodal service over such a short 
distance.  
  
4.4 Results of the initiative 
 In the role as control tower, Schenker takes the responsibility for three main functions: 
bookings, accounting and monitoring. Besides the operating functions, Schenker also has the 
responsibility of marketing and sales of the intermodal service to attract other shippers 
besides Jula. Schenker and Jula continuously discuss market issues since the aim is for 
Schenker and Jula to attract complementary flows, meaning customers with export flows and 
largely with the same shipping lines as Jula. This enables effective repositioning of containers 
and high utilisation rates on the intermodal service. This also means that Schenker does not 
merely sell capacity on the intermodal service but takes full responsibility for the customers’ 
export and import flows in order to be able to fully coordinate the usage of the service. Other 
customers that have since joined the intermodal transport service include companies like 
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Parker Hannifin, Swedish Match, A Lot of Decoration, Gyllensvaan (supplier of “Billy” 
bookshelves to IKEA). 
 For the purpose of effective repositioning of empty containers, Schenker and the inland 
terminal operator have signed agreements with shipping lines in order for them to set up an 
empty container depot in Falköping, a process more time consuming and challenging than 
expected according to the representatives of Schenker. Furthermore, Jula has developed their 
customs clearance process so that the containers/goods do not need to be cleared until they 
reach the Jula warehouse in Skara.  
 Overall, the following benefits have been achieved as compared to the previous road-
based transport service: 
 Cost-efficiency 
 Traffic safety (less heavy transport on road) 
 Environmental performance (about 80% less emissions of CO2 vs. road transport) 
 No waiting times at the Port of Gothenburg  
 No port demurrage and no road toll fee 
 Imported container stock now closer to Jula’s DC/warehouse which creates more even 
cargo flow into the DC 
 Long-term agreements 
 Jula is seen as a good benchmark in the Skaraborg region. The new set-up creates 
opportunities for the entire region and development of intermodal solutions.  
 More efficient road haulage through the exemption for long carriage (32 meter = 2 x 
40ft). 
 
The final point relates to the project initiated by Jula to develop the possibilities of road 
haulage of two 40ft containers simultaneously. This has great impact on the cost-efficiency of 
the intermodal transport solution for Jula as about 70% of their containers are 40ft containers 
and about 30% 20ft containers (cf. Bergqvist and Behrends, 2011). The current road 
restrictions only allow for the simultaneous haulage of one 40ft and one 20ft container.  
Jula started the process of applying for an exemption to the current road restrictions for 
the transport between the intermodal terminal in Falköping and the central warehouse in 
Skara in 2012, receiving final approval from the Swedish Transport Agency on 1st December 
2014. One of the biggest arguments for the exemption is that it contributes to the efficiency 
of the intermodal transport solution and, thus, modal shift from road to rail. The road haulage 
project is one of the reasons why Jula chose to sign their own local road haulage agreement; 
another decisive factor is the need for a long-term contract in order to persuade the local road 
haulier to invest in a dozen chassis in order to handle the Jula container flows between the 
intermodal terminal and Jula’s central warehouse. 
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4.5 Future developments, goals and challenges 
Currently, Schenker and the terminal operator focus on developing more agreements with 
shipping lines in order to increase usage of the container depot at the intermodal terminal at 
Falköping. Furthermore, Schenker focuses on attracting more shippers to the intermodal 
transport service. This process is time consuming since shippers are often locked in to 
existing 1-2 year agreements, but more customers are added continuously. The goal is to 
reach about 25-30,000 TEU annually (fully loaded containers in total for both directions) 
within 2-3 years; currently the service handles about 15,000 TEU annually (excluding empty 
containers). 
 Another aspect that will benefit the intermodal transport service is the current 
development of the container terminal in the port of Gothenburg which will allow longer 
trains (up to 750m) and generate many more time slots for train arrivals. Jula and the 
municipality of Falkoping have just initiated a project to investigate the opportunities of 
expanding the intermodal terminal and the transfer yard/marshalling yard in order to be able 
to handle 750m long trains. 
The partners are also planning to add additional routes to make better use of the moveable 
assets (locomotive and wagons). Possible new routes that have been identified relate to 
incoming flows of input material such as wooden plates to the region but also outgoing flows 
from the region, e.g. flows to the north of Sweden, Norway and Finland. This will, however, 
require a new agreement with the traction provider. This new initiative means that Jula and 
Schenker will gain better utilisation of their wagons and increased profit, enabling Jula to 
cross-subsidise its own transport costs even further with revenue earned not just on the 
Gothenburg-Falköping service but on additional routes as well. The sub-contracted rail 
operator will benefit from an additional contract but will not gain as much as it would were it 
to operate the new route itself in its own name. Thus the introduction of a vertically 
integrated joint venture model affects the competitive market place of third-party rail 
operators competing for traffic. On the other hand, the efficiencies gained from vertical 
integration (including in this case the terminal infrastructure as Jula’s long-term contract with 
the terminal enables efficient management and investment in the infrastructure) raise 
questions about the EU directive to separate infrastructure ownership from rail operations.  
One important conclusion is that many stakeholders in this case share the need for a 
continuous improvement process that requires all stakeholders to remain committed to 
developing the service, value-added activities and infrastructure. The elements of 
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entrepreneurship and trust are evident and the cooperative business model is crucial for the 
construction and maintenance of a sustainable win-win context.    
From the perspective of Schenker, they now consider extending the concept to other 
regions and destinations; however, this requires the same long-term commitment and 
perspective on mutually beneficial relationships with key stakeholders such as large 
shippers/customers and transport service providers. This is currently the main challenge since 
few shippers are used to or wiling to engage in this type of cooperative business model and 
setup. Schenker hopes that the best practice illustrated by the Jula case can help convince 
shippers and other stakeholders of the potential associated with this kind of business model, 
which indeed underlines the need to identify and classify its key features. 
 
5. Analysis and discussion 
The goal of the analysis is twofold. First, to establish how the innovative business model 
of the virtual joint venture has achieved the goals of the partners and to identify the key 
aspects of its implementation. This will be based on the Fawcett et al. (2008b) framework 
(benefits, barriers and bridges to strategic supply chain collaboration). The second goal is to 
analyse the application of the innovative governance form to logistics as compared to other 
business models, in order to construct a generalised model that can be applied in future cases 
of modal shift from road to intermodal transport. That part of the analysis is based on the six-
scope model of Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011). 
Findings from the first part of the analysis are presented in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4.  
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Table 2. Case study results: benefits from strategic supply chain collaboration 
Customer 
focus 
Increased customer 
responsiveness 
 Yes, as the shipper is part of the virtual joint venture providing 
the transport service, directing the services and owning the 
wagons. 
 
More consistent on-
time delivery 
 Yes, by using the inland terminal as a stock buffer for full 
containers to feed the DC when required (which is also cheaper 
than storing at or near the port) 
 
Customer satisfaction  Yes, as the shipper is part of the virtual joint venture, directing 
the services and owning the wagons. 
 All risks and profits shared between shipper and forwarder on 
an open-book basis. 
 
Shorter order 
fulfilment lead times 
 Yes, by using the inland terminal as a stock buffer for full 
containers to feed the DC when required (which is also cheaper 
than storing at or near the port) 
 
Company 
focus 
Reduced purchasing 
costs 
 As the shipper is part of the virtual joint venture and the rail 
traction is sub-contracted, there is no need to pay a profit 
margin on top to the operator. Likewise in that the shipper 
owns the rail wagons. 
 No demurrage costs at the port 
 No waiting time at the port therefore reduces haulage costs. 
 Haulage costs reduced by using longer vehicles transporting 
two 40ft containers (this is only legal when taking containers 
to/from the inland terminal). 
 
Better asset utilisation  Rail locomotives and wagons are used more efficiently because 
the shipper is involved in the planning for the service to keep it 
as full as possible. 
 As the shipper owns the wagons they are the right type for their 
needs and always available. 
 Better use of empty containers due to local empty depot. 
 
Ability to handle 
unexpected events 
 Long-term contracts ensure commitment, such as Jula 
committing to pay the inland terminal fees for five years. 
 Owning the wagons inhouse reduces problems with 
unavailability or maintenance scheduling. 
 
Reduced inventory 
costs 
 Yes, by using the inland terminal as a stock buffer. 
 
Firm productivity  The productivity of the intermodal service was higher than a 
normal third-party service because of many reasons: it was 
underwritten by a large shipper (Jula), the shipper bought the 
wagons (reducing hiring costs and uncertainties), the rail 
traction was selected by tender (thus ensuring low cost as well 
as stability), and Schenker has the responsibility to attract new 
users to the service. In addition, the inland terminal was used 
as a stock buffer. 
 
Reduced overall 
product cost 
 Yes, due to the efficiencies described above. 
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Table 3. Case study results: barriers to strategic supply chain collaboration 
Interfirm 
rivalry 
Inadequate information 
sharing 
 This may be a barrier to replicating the concept elsewhere but 
in this project it was overcome by creating the virtual joint 
venture based on an open-book arrangement sharing all 
information about the service (stock flows, timings, etc.) as 
well as sharing all risks and profits. 
 
Inconsistent operating 
goals 
 As above. 
 
Lack of willingness to 
share risks and rewards 
 The open-book basis was key to removing the need for Jula 
to pay a margin on top of the cost price. 
 
Lack of willingness to 
share information 
 As above. 
 
Managerial 
complexity 
Lack of alliance 
guidelines 
 This could have been a problem in principle but was 
overcome in this case by having already built trust by Jula 
and Schenker working together for many years before they 
established the virtual joint venture. 
 There were also the other parties involved such as the 
municipality and the inland terminal, which all had to have 
explicit contracts and guarantees with clear roles and risks. 
 However, the classification of the key features of the model 
in this paper will facilitate the use of clear guidelines in 
future application. 
 
Process poorly appraised 
in terms of cost 
 This was not a problem in this case, because the process took 
a long time to prepare, based on feasibility studies and many 
years of experience by all partners who were able to specify 
the costs involved in accurate detail. 
 
Non-aligned measures  The roles of each partner and the measures introduced and 
monitored were all clearly established. 
 
Organisation boundaries  These were clearly established by constructing the virtual 
joint venture structure, as well as the set of contracts between 
all the other parties. 
 
Measuring supply chain 
contribution 
 Roles and responsibilities were clearly established. For 
example, Jula purchased the wagons and Schenker was 
responsible for marketing and sales to attract additional 
shippers to the intermodal service. 
 
Measuring customer 
demand 
 This was done in a feasibility study initiated by the 
municipality (and owner of the inland terminal), and the core 
demand provided by Jula underpinned the service. 
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Table 4. Case study results: bridges to strategic supply chain collaboration 
Operations, 
process & 
supply 
management 
Accurate comprehensive 
measures 
 This derives from overcoming the potential barriers relating 
to shared goals of partners and agreement on using the same 
metrics and processes for monitoring the process and 
measuring its success. As the former elements were all in 
place, this bridge can be viewed as being successfully in 
place. 
 
Supplier alignment and 
rationalisation 
 By setting up a virtual joint venture between a large shipper 
and a dedicated forwarder and then sub-contracting the rail 
traction for two years, the supply of the service is stabilised. 
 It is also rationalised by using competition for the market 
(tender) rather than direct on-rail competition which can 
increase transaction costs and reduce asset utilisation by 
changing operator and equipment.  
 Owning their own wagons also reduces transaction costs and 
obviates the need to pay a profit margin to the operator for 
wagon provision. 
 
Effective use of pilot 
projects 
 It is difficult to run a pilot project in the provision of rail 
services due to the long planning time and high expense 
involved. But (see next point), the project was planned in 
great detail before commencing. 
 
Process documentation 
and ownership 
 The project was prepared in detail with feasibility studies, 
based on many contracts between partners and underwritten 
with the high container flows of Jula therefore the service 
was established with a clear process. 
People 
management 
Managerial and 
employee support 
 The personnel directly involved were for the most part 
already known to each other therefore already had the 
seniority to pursue the project, therefore new managerial 
support was not required in this instance. However, of course 
the virtual joint venture had to be approved by senior 
management at both organisations. 
Open information 
sharing 
 Open-book basis and sharing of risk and profit between 
virtual joint venture members Jula and Schenker. 
 
Trust-based alliances  Staff had pre-existing personal relationships with each other 
for many years. 
 
Cross-trained 
experienced managers 
 As the two organisations had already worked together for 
many years, there was a good level of cross-training and 
knowledge sharing already in place. 
 
Supply chain education 
and training 
 Additional formal education was not required, beyond 
experience developed in the role. 
 
Using chain advisory 
councils 
 The municipality as initial instigator of the scheme and 
investor in the terminal was able to provide advice and 
integration with the business community and other relevant 
chambers and associations. 
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The particular aim of the Fawcett et al. (2008b) framework is its focus on the strategic 
aspect of collaboration. This focus is suitable for application to the virtual joint venture in this 
case, whereby it is a long-term strategic venture rather than purely a cost-saving measure. 
Indeed, the literature review suggests that supply chain collaboration tends to be more 
operational than strategic (Sandberg, 2007; Fugate et al., 2009); in this case, a deliberate 
strategic aspect was clearly revealed. By the shipper including transport in its core business, it 
has not only secured this initial route but expanded the scope of the transport service to the 
point where the firm is beginning to have its own transport costs cross-subsidised by other 
users. The application of the framework nevertheless reveals many practical benefits, such as 
savings in cost and time by taking direct control of the service rather than the usual third-
party contractual handling of transport services. Responsiveness was increased and lead times 
reduced by using the inland terminal as a stock buffer for incoming containers, rather than 
using the port. The literature also showed that other logistics decisions influence the potential 
for integration, such as the centralisation and relocation of plants and distribution centres, a 
reduction in the supplier base and a consolidation of the carrier base (Lemoine & Skjoett-
Larsen, 2004; Abrahamsson & Brege, 1997). In this case, the shipper’s use of one large 
distribution centre and one port allows flows to be consolidated on a single rail link. 
The potential barriers identified by Fawcett et al. (2008b) derive from interfirm rivalry 
and managerial complexity. None of these potential barriers were observed in this case, 
which is an unexpected result that suggests the model adopted by the partners was very 
effective. On the other hand, it is recognised that this is something of a unique situation 
because the two firms have been working together for many years and a high level of 
personal trust was already established, which is not always possible to replicate. There is also 
some risk of response bias from the interviews producing a hesitation to reveal negative 
aspects of the business model. However, even given this positive background, in order to 
form the virtual joint venture the partners needed to take a further step by investing 
significant sums in equipment, signing various contracts with other organisations, offering a 
financial guarantee to the inland terminal and taking a large risk with the reliability of their 
incoming shipments. Jula is a relatively large company and they possess the leverage to 
obtain the cheapest road haulage rates, so they would normally have less motivation to take 
the risk of switching their flows to intermodal transport. Therefore, perhaps it is unsurprising 
that they have only done so via a method whereby they retain a large share of control. 
Comparisons can be made to the use of intermodal transport by UK retailer Tesco, whereby 
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the retailer purchases whole trains from the rail operator in order to be able to control the 
timings and rely less on other organisations (Monios, 2015). 
Most interesting in terms of seeking to replicate this case in future, the bridges enabling 
successful collaboration were trust and people management (as already discussed), but also 
the rationalisation and alignment of processes, as the literature showed the importance of 
decision synchronisation (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005) and joint product development 
(Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). This is why it is essential to ensure direct participation of 
the shipper, because it forges a close relationship between the parties and also allows flow 
management to be managed directly in a highly responsive manner. This therefore increases 
partner compatibility (Whipple & Frankel, 2000). As discussed by Frankel et al. (1996), 
partners in a strategic alliance will likely need to modify their existing logistical setup to 
increase efficiency under the new model; however, formal control mechanisms like contracts 
and the resulting transaction costs of monitoring are ideally replaced to a certain degree by 
trust, as also noted by Todeva & Knoke (2005). The actual form taken by the alliance will 
depend on several factors, such as the motive, the business environment, industry structure, 
organisational structure and other drivers specific to the local context. The analysis in the 
framework showed that indeed the partners did need to modify their existing logistics setup to 
fit the new model; however, it is important to observe that the shipper Jula wanted to retain 
the involvement of their haulier Schenker in the intermodal transport solution. This is a 
common issue when persuading a large shipper to change modes to rail for a particular route 
as they will still be relying heavily on their road haulier or freight forwarder for most of their 
traffic and will be wary of damaging that relationship. 
The next section of the analysis is to identify and classify the type of business model 
adopted by Jula and Schenker. It is not full integration therefore it will be one of the hybrid 
models of partnership and alliance identified in the literature review (see section 2.2). The 
question to be determined is whether it is a joint venture or a less integrated model such as 
equity investment or strategic cooperative agreement. 
A joint venture requires actually establishing a new organisation which is not the case 
here. Indeed, the service is still run by Schenker for Jula as before. The difference is that it is 
open book so both companies know if the service made a profit or loss and they have agreed 
to share the profit/loss. The other differences are that Jula guarantees a certain volume to 
Schenker and a certain income to the terminal, and Jula has purchased rail wagons. So Jula 
has not made equity investments in a joint venture organisation, but it has made investments 
related to setting up the service. Specific investments were described by Dyer & Singh (1998) 
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as a self-enforcing mechanism for supply chain collaboration. This therefore represents an 
innovative way to set up a new intermodal transport service that achieves greater buy-in from 
the shipper, and this could be a new business model for actors to adopt that gets buy-in from 
both sides. It is virtual in the sense that they did not actually set up a new organisation (which 
would make it a joint venture) but they act as if they have. Comparisons can be made to 
Porter’s (1998; p.80) discussion of clusters: “A cluster allows each member to benefit as if it 
had greater scale or as if it had joined with others, without sacrificing its flexibility.” 
Therefore, the specific kind of strategic alliance used by the partners could be described as a 
contractual third-party relationship to operate a service but with increased buy-in (literally, in 
this case) from the shipper, leading it closer to being a joint venture. So they act as if it is a 
joint venture, but without sacrificing flexibility or independence. So the service can be 
defined as a “virtual joint venture”. 
The next step is to identify the specific aspects of applying the virtual joint venture in 
logistics as opposed to other sectors, which is done by using the six-scope model of 
Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011), presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Case results according to the six-scope model 
Scope 
Case findings classified 
according to Schmoltzi 
& Wallenburg (2011) 
terminology 
Case findings description 
Contractual 
Elements of contractual 
agreement, minority stake 
agreement and joint 
venture agreement 
It is not a new entity but a “virtual” joint venture, 
based on several contractual agreements (e.g. with 
the terminal, the municipality, the rail traction 
provider) as well as significant investments and a 
high level of trust between Jula and Schenker. 
Organisational Multilateral 
Two partners (Jula & Schenker) with additional 
cooperation and contracts with the intermodal 
terminal owner and a sub-contracting relationship 
with the rail operator. 
Functional Quasi-concentration 
The virtual joint venture agreement includes supply 
of assets (wagons), production of transport services, 
joint sales and marketing. High level of functional 
integration and development of new services. 
Geographical Regional Started as a single route but now expanding. 
Service Intermodal 
The core product is a single rail route; however, 
Schenker provides pre- and end-haulage and the 
terminal operator is also involved in stock buffering 
and empty container management, and they also 
obtained legal permission to use longer trucks for 
the terminal haulage, so overall it can be described 
as an intermodal product. 
Resource 
Schmoltzi & Wallenburg 
(2011) focus on 
horizontal integration 
therefore their categories 
are not directly relevant to 
this case. 
As with most vertical integration, a resource 
complementarity exists as each partner needs the 
other to provide their part of the service. What is 
unique in this case is the blend of asset ownership, 
service provision, contracts, other investment and 
long time scale. 
 
The results in the table reveal the key differences between the “virtual joint venture” business 
model and a regular joint venture or a less integrated partnership or alliance. The case 
exhibited a high level of functional integration between the partners, reflected in the longer 
contracts, the investment of the shipper in transport assets and the joint marketing and sales 
(often an overlooked area of contention in intermodal transport – cf. Bergqvist & Monios, 
2014). Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the sixth scope, but as Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg (2011) focus on horizontal integration, their categories are not relevant here and 
must be derived directly from the case. As with most vertical integration, a resource 
complementarity exists as each partner needs the other to provide their part of the service. 
What is unique in this case is the blend of asset ownership (sub-contracted rail operator 
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provides the loco, Jula provides the wagons), service provision (Schenker books the rail 
operator and manages the service while Jula underwrites it with a certain level of cargo 
backed by a financial guarantee to the terminal), contracts (many contracts with the inland 
terminal, the municipality, the port terminal operator and others) other investment (terminal 
owner invested significantly in the terminal) and long time scale (reasonably long contracts 
were signed by all partners). The result is greater levels of many of the most important 
attributes from the Fawcett et al. (2008b) model such as trust, learning and continuous 
improvement, information sharing, willingness to take risks and an increased alignment of 
goals, all of which underpin successful supply chain management, but are particularly 
important in the difficult task of encouraging shippers to change modes from road to 
intermodal transport. 
 
6. Conclusion  
The supply chain literature discusses various business models adopted to manage 
relationships between stakeholders, such as partnerships, alliances, joint ventures or 
integration through mergers and acquisitions. Each involves varying levels of integration and 
collaboration, as well as risk and reward. When applied to logistics, each has been shown to 
exhibit different levels of success depending on particular factors.  
This paper examined a strategic alliance between a large shipper and a freight forwarder 
to provide an intermodal service to and from the port of Gothenburg. According to this 
innovative model, a new entity is not set up (as it would be with a joint venture) but an open-
book basis is established, long-term contracts with other parties are signed, risks and profits 
are shared, and several investments specific to the service were made, including new wagon 
assets by the shipper Jula and new terminal facilities by the terminal owner. This model 
therefore goes beyond a usual strategic alliance because of the purchase of new assets and 
other investments in the service, which move the model closer to being a joint venture. Thus 
the benefits of a joint venture are obtained while the forwarder provides what is nevertheless 
still a third-party contractual service. What is particularly interesting is that the forwarder 
Schenker is considering expanding the service to another route serving different shippers with 
the use of Jula’s wagons and the profits from this service will cross-subsidise the original 
route. Therefore the two partners are acting like a new entity, even though the actual service 
will be run by Schenker. The other difference is that, unlike a typical joint venture which is 
time-limited, this partnership is an ongoing strategic initiative. 
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By analysing the case study according to a 30-point framework of benefits, barriers and 
bridges to successful supply chain management, it was shown that this model utilised many 
of the benefits relating to trust and commitment to overcome most of the potential barriers. In 
addition, by the direct involvement of the shipper in product development and decision 
synchronisation, the benefits achieved went beyond just cost reduction to include greater 
strategic control over the service and future development possibilities.  
Using hierarchies of integration from the literature (from market-based to full 
integration), the innovative model can be classified as a unique kind of strategic alliance that 
moves towards a joint venture due to the significant investments, high level of functional 
integration and especially the new service development. The model was therefore classified 
as a “virtual joint venture”, whereby the partners obtain the benefits as if they were in a joint 
venture without needing to establish a new organisation and thus sacrifice flexibility and 
independence. Although in its early stages of development, results indicate several 
advantages of this model, including risk sharing, knowledge development, long-term service 
stability and diversification of activities which all contribute to facilitating the shift of the 
large customer from road haulage to intermodal transport. Potential challenges mainly relate 
to contractual and relationship complexity, but the features of the model identified in this 
paper can be used in future in other cases to make modal shift more attractive and successful.  
One limitation of this study is that it was based on one case, and it may be difficult to 
replicate the high levels of trust in other situations, thus further study is required of similarly 
integrated alliances used in logistics. Having said that, the literature shows that high levels of 
trust are essential for all partnerships and alliances, even less integrated models than the one 
examined in this paper. The key aspect of the new model is an organisation changing its 
functional scope, which has enabled the high level of process integration beyond that 
achievable by regular outsourcing or even through an open-book outsourcing model. This 
suggests that aspects of the business model can be generalizable to other collaborative 
partnerships for producing intermodal transport services. The case shows that a shipper can 
invest in assets unrelated to their core business (in this case transport assets, i.e. rail wagons) 
and use the fees paid by other users of the service to cross-subsidize their own transport costs. 
The goal of identifying and classifying a best practice business model is to demonstrate that 
other cases can achieve similar results if willing to alter their logistics setup and modify their 
view on what is their core business.  
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